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Abstract
The 'public goods' characteristicspossessed by intangible works of authorship
and invention present the basic market failure problem usually relied on to
justify intellectual property rights. What is ordinarilyless emphasized is that
such market failure is no more than half of the prerequisite for an
economically desirable copyright or patent system: another requisite
condition is that there be less costly market imperfections after intellectual
property is instituted than there would have been in the absence of the
intellectual property regime. Intellectual property rights are best justified in
the presence of "asymmetric market conditions", that is where (1) in the
absence of intellectual property rights, there will be marketfailure; and (2) in
the presence of intellectual property rights, there will be market success.
The article compares areas of copyright law in which systemic rules
have been used to minimize market imperfections and to further market
formation with other areas of copyright in which doctrines such as the fair
use doctrine and notions of reasonablenesshave been used to develop case by
case solutions. In particular,the article examines whetherface to face refusal
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to license can ever constitute the kind of market failure which would justify
refusing to enforce an intellectual property right. The latter problem arises
when copyright owners try to suppress hostile or unorthodox adaptationsof
their work. The device of "asymmetric market conditions" is also used to
examine the presumption within restitutionlaw that people who refrainfrom
crossing others' tangible boundariesarefree to take advantage of each other's
labor. The article then uses the same conceptual tools to explain why
intellectual property law reverses this presumptivefreedom and replaces it
with a duty not to copy.

L Introduction
A. Market failure and market success
This piece seeks to unify various problems in intellectual property law
by making use of a single perspective, that of market failure. Under
an economic view, the issue of whether intellectual property
protection should be adopted for a given industry or intangible
should depend largely on an institutional comparison of costs and
benefits. Put differently, we can analyze the question of whether
adopting intellectual property rights will produce a net allocative gain
by asking: would the market imperfections of a regime possessing
intellectual property law be more or less costly than those
imperfections which would otherwise be present? This is ultimately
an empirical question, but it is possible to suggest some plausible
hypotheses. The most fundamental hypothesis is this: for a marketbased intellectual property system such as copyright and patent to be
economically justifiable, there must be what I call an "asymmetry of
market conditions." Put most simply, such asymmetry appears
where:
1.

In the absence of intellectual property rights, there will be
market failure; 1 and

1

The first condition is that authors and inventors would not be able to
obtain much payment for their work in the absence of a rule that
restrained strangers from copying, and, as a result, potential creators
produce fewer works than the public would have been willing to pay
for if payment had been required. This shortfall evidences the market
failure.
The paradigmatic form of market failure is a prisoner's dilemma.
Roughly speaking: where the payoff from copying is very high and the
penalty for engaging in independent creation when the other party
copies is also very high, little independent creation is likely to occur
even though significant positive social and individual payoffs might
have resulted if both parties had chosen the route of independent
creation. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failureand Prisoner's
Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853 (1992)
[hereinafter Asymmetric Market Failure].
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In the presence2 of intellectual property rights, there will be
market success.

The reader is probably familiar with the basic market failure
problem cited as the usual justification for intellectual property
regimes: it is usually termed the "public goods" problem, and is
briefly described below. What is less recognized is the fact that such
market failure is only half of the prerequisite: the other requisite
condition is that there be less costly market imperfections after
intellectual property is instituted than there would have been in the
3
absence of the intellectual property regime.
B. Market failure in the absence of intellectual property
"Public goods" are defined by having two characteristics,
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability. 4 Most intangibles have these
characteristics to some extent. Intangibles tend to be inexhaustible
over a large range of utilization (everyone can sing or play the same
song, or build the same design of engine, without interfering with
others' use). They also tend to be difficult for proprietors to fence off
(once encountered and remembered, anyone can reproduce the song
or design).5 If production of a public good is left entirely to the private
market, lack of fencing can lead to under-production, for usually a
producer needs a mode of excluding non-payors if he or she wishes to
obtain payment for what he or she has made. 6 Without a mode of

2
3

4

5

Market success occurs when, inter alia, parties who wish to trade can
deal with each other at fairly low levels of transaction costs. See id.
This is explored more deeply in Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78
VIRGINInA L. Rav. 149, 230-38 (1992) [hereinafter On Owning Information];
Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure,supra note 1; and Wendy J. Gordon,
Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual Property,21 J. oF
LEGAL STuD. 449 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Of Harms and Benefits].
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 1600, 1611 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Gordon, Fair Use] and
sources cited therein.
In practice, these properties are not fully present. Thus, the value of a

song can become zero through saturation-level repetition, and some
exhaustible physical products- such as a phonograph record or a radio
set-- may be necessary to afford access to the intangible. Practically
speaking, then, songs may not be infinitely available to all as a valuable
good. The same partiality characterizes an intangible's nonexcludability.
Thus, for example, though songs are easy to copy once heard, the initial
score may be easy for the composer to keep private. Or the composer
may be able to extract no-copy promises from his early, small audiences.
Even after a song is popular it may be desired in a format that favors an
authorized producer's distribution networks.
6

The extent to which public provision of public goods is indeed
necessary in various contexts is, of course, a matter of debate. For
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exclusion, the payoff from investing in creative activities will be low,
and incentives will be inadequate to induce production of as many
new intangible goods as the public would be willing to pay for.
Some public goods, such as national defense, can be produced
through use of a state apparatus. This approach has the virtue of
responding to both "public goods" characteristics. State production (1)
takes advantage of inexhaustibility by making the benefit available to
all, and (2) resolves the problem of underproduction by requiring
everyone, through taxes, to pay.
The United States is committed to the belief that sole reliance
on state-directed production or bureaucratic subsidy is not the best
way to produce inventions and art. In the realm of inventions,
probably the most obvious danger of state control is the bureaucratic
tendency to resist innovation. In the realm of cultural products, the
most obvious dangers of state control are "lack of taste," 7 and the
possibility of censorship. (A history of free enterprise, of course, also
plays a role.) Whatever the reason, there is a consensus in the United
States that a diversity of private initiatives needs to be enlisted, and
that state production-- despite its ability to respond to both
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability-- should not be the primary
route to follow in regard to inventions and art.
Thus, the United States, like most western nations, opted for
primary reliance on use of the private market to generate incentives
for the production of inventions and art. Using a market requires
curing the excludability problem. Some scholars have argued that
significant modes of exclusion are available independent of the law. 8
For instance, even in a legal system without copyright (one might call
such a system "copy liberty"), a writer and her authorized publisher
could obtain payment through exploiting natural levers such as the

7

8

example, Ronald Coase has shown that although lighthouses are a
classic public good (their light can be used by a virtually unlimited
number of ships within range, and no ship can be practicably excluded
from their light), some lighthouses have in fact been built through nongovernmental arrangements. See R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J. LAw & ECON. 357 (1974).
Or, more precisely, there is a need for taste to evolve outside the state
apparatus in order for individuals to maintain some degree of genuine
self-determination. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to
ConstitutionallyProtected Liberty, 134 U. PA. LAw REv. 741 (1986).
Scholars who are critical of copyright, or who doubt the wisdom of its
expansion, typically argue that copyright may not be necessary for
creators to obtain payment for their work. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 350 (1970); Tom Palmer,
Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12
HAMUNE L. REv. 261 (1989).
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advantage of being first in a market or having a reputation for
providing authentic, distortion-free texts. But within the first years of
the American republic, its Congress decided 9 to provide legally
enforceable rights of exclusion by enacting intellectual property laws
such as copyright and patent. These laws give individual creative
persons the right to forbid copying1 ° of their works.
This right provides remuneration, and thus an incentive to
produce new works, in two primary ways. First, it provides creators
with leverage in dealing with their first and primary customer: it
induces potential publishers or manufacturers to pay in order to lift
the "no-copy" ban. Second, it makes publishers and manufacturers
willing to pay meaningful sums for the privilege of copying because the
exclusive right provides some protection against unauthorized
competition from outsiders.
Thus, intellectual property law responds primarily to the
second "public goods" characteristic -- difficulty of fencing- and does
so by altering that characteristic by legal fiat. The law provides
fences, which in turn assist the producers in capturing for their own
pockets some of the benefits their efforts generate. The system relies
on the premise that such enrichment will induce new investment in
creative endeavor and that enough new investment will be createdinvestment that would not otherwise exist- that the value produced
by this investment will outweigh the extra administrative and other
costs of the intellectual property system."

9

10
11

The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent
"for limited times" to further "the progress of Science and the useful
arts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress enacted its first copyright
statute in 1790.
Also, American patent law prohibits even duplication of the patented
invention that happens to result from completely independent efforts.
The incentives for the creation of new work provided by an intellectual
property system must be we.ghed against the deadweight loss and
administrative costs of the system; the economic goal is to obtain the
highest net sum. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). See
also Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price

Discrimination,8 REs. L. & ECON. 181 (1986) (edited by R. Zerbe).
What matters is not the absolute level of administrative costs involved
in an intellectual property system, but rather a comparison among the
costs of the various potential systems. Even a system of no intellectual
property rights will have significant administrative costs. For example,

assume there is a legal regime that rejects patent and copyright and
recognizes only individually-negotiated contracts as a limitation on the
public's ability to copy. In such a context, for example, inventors may
spend a good deal of money on policing the secrecy of their inventions,
composers may spend a good deal of money on obtaining contractual
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C. Success of the intellectual property market
Even before we begin, we know that an intellectual property market
cannot be "perfect," if by perfection one means a market where
everyone willing to pay more than a good's marginal cost is able to
purchase the good. No matter how low the marginal cost of an
intangible might be-- and it might be as low as zero1 2 - some people
who are willing to pay for the good at that level or above will not
have access to it, for intellectual property law allows producers to
demand payment in excess of marginal cost.
This is desirable for incentives, for it is hoped that the price
above marginal cost will cover research and development expenses
and induce other potential producers to make new intangibles.
Nevertheless it is clear that a right of exclusion, although the core of
intellectual property law, is only a partial response to intangibles'
public goods characteristics, for such law leaves the public unable to
take full advantage of the inexhaustibility of intangibles. Instead, the
failed promise of inexhaustibility merely exaggerates the deadweight
loss that is a cost for all monopolies.
In addition to providing a right of exclusion, a successful
intellectual property system should also be tailored to take as much
advantage of inexhaustability as possible. If something can be copied
at no cost, there must be some instances in which allowing free
copying will be Pareto-superior. 3 As will appear, the American legal

12

13

promises-not-to-copy from people who seek entry to concerts, and the
like.
Similarly, it should not be imagined that intellectual property rights are
the only way that costly decreases in public access occur. A regime
without intellectual property rights will afford far from unlimited access
to the public. To use the prior examples: the inventor unprotected by
patent may be unwilling to trade information with rival firms, and
composers unprotected by copyright may be unwilling to allow radios
or television to broadcast their music to general audiences.
In short, it should not be imagined that underproduction is the only cost
of the system without intellectual property rights. For further analysis of
the many possible alternatives to copyright law and their costs, see
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challengesof
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343
(1989) [hereinafter Merits of Copyright].
The marginal cost of producing an extra unit of an intangible may be
zero, because of inexhaustability, or it may be some positive sum
corresponding to the cost of the intangible's physical embodiment (such
as the cost of the plastic that goes into a phonograph record).
It might be argued that in cases of true Pareto-superiority, the law
would not need to provide a safe-harbor for free copying: if the owners
of the patents and copyrights were truly unharmed by the copying (as
the notion of pareto-superiority assumes), they would allow the copying
to proceed without hindrance.

14 Journal of Low and Information Science
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system makes some effort, albeit minor, to recapture the lost promise
of inexhaustability.

IL Comparingsystemic with case-by-caseresponses.
For an intellectual property regime to have even a chance of
producing more allocative gain than a "copy-liberty" regime, the
intellectual property regime must produce resource packages that are
tradable.14 It must also minimize its deadweight costs and other
imperfections. In the following, the article will explore some of the
devices that American copyright law employs to keep its
imperfections at a minimum.
Some of these devices are system-wide responses, where
sharp rules are set out. Adjudication under sharply defined rules is
sometimes known as using a "property" or "formal" approach.
Copyright law also has another kind of response: employment of
open-textured rules which require case-by-case substantive inquiry.
The latter kind of devices might be said to employ a "nonformal tort"
or "reasonableness" approach; in them, a court typically makes a
substantive judgment as to the desirability of the defendant's
challenged behavior.
A. Definitions: formal property rules as compared with substantive
reasonableness principles
In American common law, violation of most property or personal
rights will be termed a "tort.'15 Yet torts themselves tend to fall into

However, humans are both envious and insecure. The copyright owner
might refuse permission not because he is suffering tangible harm, but
because he is irritated that other people are getting a free ride or because
he has irrational fears about future harm. A society may well choose to
consider itself entitled to disregard envy and insecurity as legally
14

relevant harms.
Cf. Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundationfor Exchang 14 J. LEGAL
STUD.

15

321 (1985).

The other two types of rights that can be sued upon in American civil
(non-criminal) courts are those arising out of contract law and
restitution.
"Restitution" is concerned with benefits rather than harms. See Gordon,
Of Harms and Benefits, supra note 3. See also Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65 (1985). Like negligence law, restitution
involves a case-by-case mode of adjudication.
In restitution a person brings suit on the ground that the defendant has
been unjustly enriched and that this enrichment came either at the
plaintiffs expense or by violating some right of his. There is an obvious
need for case-by-case adjudication in order to decide what enrichments
are "unjust." Restitution also functions as a remedy following on the
violation of other rights (e.g., restitution may require a trespasser to
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two broad categories: intentional torts like battery or trespass, which
are ordinarily actionable without proof that the defendant's specific
behavior was socially undesirable, and unintentional torts, which are
ordinarily actionable only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's
behavior was negligent or otherwise unreasonable. As a matter of
categorization, the first type of tort can be viewed as following a
"property" or "formal" model and the second as following a
"nonformal tort," "reasonableness" or "substantive" model.16Y
In the "property" or "formal" model, the courts defer to the
property owner as if she were a mini-sovereign, making no inquiry
into whether the owner's decision to exclude a defendant was proper
or improper, or whether the defendant's use of the owner's resource
was harmful or productive. A classic example under American law is
trespass to land. Someone who enters land reasonably but mistakenly
thinking he has the right to do so will be liable as a trespasser, as will
someone who entered the land out of a pressing need to save time by
a shortcut. 8 Following out the analogy to sovereignty, the primary

relevant question in these cases is essentially jurisdictional

19

inquiring into whether the defendant crossed a boundary over which

16

17

return the profit he made by trespassing on a plaintiff's land).
Restitution is discussed further in this article at pages 24-29, below.
I am indebted here to the work of William Powers. Comparing trespass
with negligence, for example, Professor Powers notes:
Ownership embodies a formal methodology, since...
questions concerning appropriate use are answered
wholly by asking whether a proposed use has been
sanctioned by the owner. A decision by the landowner.
. concludes legal debate under the ownership model.
On the other hand, a duty of reasonable use embodies a
nonformal methodology because it makes direct, ad hoc
reference to efficiency [or other measures of social
desirability]. Under this model, a decision concerning
the landowner... would depend on a comparison of
relative costs and benefits in the specific case.
William C. Powers, Jr., A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act
(review essay), 57 TEXAs L. REv. 523, 526-27 (1979).
Also consider the distinction between "rules" and "principles" in

Ronald Dworkin,
18

19

TAKNG RiGHTs SERIOUSLY (1977).

Admittedly, even in intentional torts American courts may take
cognizance of excuses (such as incapacity) and justifications (such as
necessity or self-defense). This does not undermine the distinction
between intentional and unintentional torts, however. Not only is the
burden of proving such intentional-tort defenses typically on the
defendant, but these defenses also permit a court far less latitude than
does the broad balancing of costs and benefits which a court engages in
under a reasonableness inquiry. Thus, a person taking a shortcut
through another's land can take advantage of the "necessity" defense
only if an imminent danger made the shortcut imperative.
See Powers, supra note 16.
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the owner possessed an exclusive right and did so without obtaining
the owner's consent. If so, the defendant has broken the relevant rule
and is liable.
By contrast, in the "nonformal tort" or "reasonableness"
model, a court does not assume as a prima facie matter that deference
is owed to the decisions of the property owner. Instead, the court
makes its own substantive inquiry into the desirability of the
defendant's boundary-crossing; further, the burden of proof will
likely be placed on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the
defendant's behavior was wrongful. A classic example in the United
States is negligence law: in unintentional auto accidents, unless a
defendant is found to have lacked "due care," she will not be required
to pay for the damage she caused.
American copyright law follows an uneasy middle course
between the rule-bound "formal" model and the principle-based
"reasonableness" model. On the one hand, virtually any unauthorized
substantial copying of a protected subject matter is subject to a prima
facie prohibition. For example, even "unconscious copying" gives rise
to liability; similarly, if a clever plagiarist convinces a magazine
publisher that a short story is original, the publisher's good-faith
belief that she had permission to print will not help the publisher
avoid liability in a copyright infringement suit. This partakes of a
formal or "property" approach.
On the other hand, the fact-finder (usually the jury) has both
latitude and significant normative responsibility in deciding how
much similarity amounts to "substantiality."20 In any case that
involves other than exact copying, a defendant will probably.try to

2D

There are many verbal formulations as to the meaning of "substantial
similarity," also known as "illicit copying," but none does very much to
define the jury's task. Consider, for example, a classic case regarding
music infringement, Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied 330 U.S. 851 (1947). First, the court valuably noted that,
"Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough;
for there can be 'permissible copying,' copying which is not illicit." Id. at
472. But then it foundered when it had to distinguish rightful from
illicit copying:
The proper criterion on that issue . . .is whether

defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed,
that the defendant wrongfully appropriated something
which belongs to the plaintiff.
Id. at 473.

Aside from the reference to the lay (non-expert) audience, this
formulation offers no more than vague references to quantity ("so
much"), to market value, and to a conclusory notion of wrongfulness.
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argue that his work is not "substantially similar" to plaintiff's
copyrighted work. 21 The openness of the resulting inquiry involves a

"reasonableness" approach.

Another and perhaps more important instance of a
"reasonableness" model in American copyright law is the doctrine of
"fair use," which is available to defendants even in cases of substantial
copying. A defendant will have no legal liability for making a copy
which is "fair" in her particular circumstances. 22 Although the fair use
doctrine appears in the Copyright Act, that statute declines to set out
any definite strictures. 23 Formal line-drawing is rejected. As the

21

22

23

If there is a great deal of quantitative resemblance, it is highly likely that
substantial similarity will be found. The range of discretion is usually
more limited on questions of substantial similarity than on questions of
"fair use." The latter doctrine is discussed immediately below.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107. As originally enacted, section 107 provided as
follows:
107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [which
set out a copyright owner's exclusive rights of
reproduction, adaptation, public performance, and the
like], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The section was recently amended to make clear
that the unpublished status of a work should not be determinative.
For my further examinations of the doctrine, see, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use,
supra note 4, (using an economic model to unify fair use cases and give
some precision to the notoriously open-ended doctrine). See also Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993)
[hereinafter Property Right in Self-Expression]; Wendy J. Gordon, Reality
as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 93
(1992).
The legislative history of section 107 indicates that, despite the statutory
recognition accorded fair use, the nature of the doctrine remains to be
defined by case law: 'The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
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legislative history recounts, "[Slince the doctrine is an equitable rule of
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts. "24 The fair use
defense essentially draws the court into deciding the social
desirability of the defendant's copying.
B. Copyright's unusual mid-range status
At first blush, it is surprising to find American copyright law placing
at the virtual center of a plaintiff's case the distinctively nonformal
principles of "substantiality" and "fairness." After all, copyright is a
form of property, and copyists always act volitionally and
deliberately. (For example, they know they are publicly performing,
or using the photocopy machine, or playing music on their guitar,
even if they don't know that they are copying someone else while
doing so.) It seems most logical that such a volitional trespass should
be treated under a formal rule, as are other non-accidental violations
of property rights. The mere act of nonconsensual copying is
arguably like the mere act of stepping onto someone else's land
without permission, and arguably should give rise to similar liability.
So why is this not the case?
Economics does not yield an immediate answer. The classic
article by Calabresi and Melamed25 tells us that intentional takings of
property are prima facie wrongful because people should not depart
from the market without a strong justification. Their article tells us
that accident law uses a "reasonableness" inquiry because, in
accidents, such a justification is present: the participants cannot
bargain with each other in advance. An hour before a driver hits a
pedestrian, for example, neither one knows she has any reason to deal
with the other. In the presence of such complete market failure, we
are told, the court "mimics the market" through a negligence inquiry,
trying to determine whether the parties behaved efficiently and
imposing liability accordingly.

the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
statute ..... H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680 [hereinafter House Report]. See also S. REI'. No. 94473, 1st Sess. 62 (1975) [Senate Report]. The courts have recognized their
freedom to continue the development of fair use doctrine. See, e.g.,
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d

24
25

1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Congress made clear that it in no way
intended to depart from Court-created principles or to short-circuit
further judicial development .... ").
House Report at 65, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089

(1975).
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But in copyright the "substantiality" inquiry and the "fair use"
doctrine are both available regardless of whether the copyright owner
and the copyist have complete knowledge of each other's identity and
are otherwise able to bargain. Thus, in the most recent "fair use" case
to reach the United States Supreme Court, the parties had the
requisite knowledge and transaction costs were minimal. Defendant,
the rap group "2 Live Crew," had in fact offered the copyright owners
compensation in exchange for permission to make a parody of their
song, "Pretty Woman." The copyright owners simply refused to give
them permission. This hardly looks like market failure -- the two
parties were virtually face to face. Yet the Supreme Court indicated
that fair use might nevertheless be available to shield the makers of
the parody from liability.26 How, then, can such a doctrine be
squared, either with usual American patterns of tort and property
law, or with economic notions of market failure?
The answer lies in the imperfection of intellectual property as
a response to the "public goods" problem. In the absence of perfect
price discrimination,2 obtaining adequate incentives for production
will necessarily involve a price that is set above marginal cost, and
thus a quantity produced that is below the quantity that would be
produced by a competitive market. Market imperfection is present in
even the most pristine copyright transaction. The issue is how legal
institutions cure the imperfections caused by excludability without
losing the benefits excludability brings.
Or, one can put the same matter in non-economic normative
terms. Copying is not necessarily wrongful. It is how we learn,2 it can be
both harmless and beneficial,29 and it is the essence of having a common
culture.30 Therefore it would be absurd to make all copiers primafacie liable
as infringers.

26

2

28
29
30

See Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The case was
remanded for further proceedings in light of an opinion that, inter alia
made clear the copyright owner's refusing to license might not work
against a fair use finding. See id. (parodists are unlikely to be able to
obtain consents). See also id. at 585 n.18 ("we reject Acuff Rose's
argument that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the original
should be weighed against a fair use finding.").
See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. &
EcoN. 293 (1970).
See Benjamin Kaplan, AN UNHUR o VIEw oF CoPYRIcHT (1967)
If copying is harmless, allowing copying produces a Pareto-superior
result: no one is hurt and the copyist and her customers gain.
See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 3; Gordon, PropertyRight
in Self-Expression, supra note 22.
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The trick is to find some means to distinguish wrongful from
fair copying. Some of those means are case-by-case, like "substantial
similarity" and "fair use." Some are system-wide rules.
C. Utility of the distinction
Western culture has long recognized the tension between the law's
need to speak clearly to cover broad classes of cases, and the desire to
do justice in the individual case. In English translations of Aristotle,
the term "equity" is typically given to judges' power to modify the law
to take account of individual cases. 31
Sometimes the choice among legal responses is dictated by
history, mores, or political pressures.32 Yet one can also attempt to
make an economic judgment comparing the costs and benefits of the
systemic (formal) approach, with the costs and benefits of the case-bycase (reasonableness) approach that characterizes the Aristotelian
notion of equity. An economic perspective might help a student of
comparative institutions parse the various influences that have
affected different nations' choices among modes of dealing with a
common challenge.
Professor William Powers has well summarized the key costs
and benefits of the two approaches. The formal approach "enhances
predictability, is easier to apply, and controls bias or other sources of
error in the decisionmaking process." A formal approach also has
costs, most importantly the "social cost of tolerating uses that do not
maximize aggregate welfare in the short run."33
The reasonableness approach has the converse characteristics.
Thus, its prime virtue is that it allows the law to fine-tune its results to
match circumstances, so that socially valuable behavior is not cut off
or penalized by overbroad rules. 4 On the other hand, the
31

In Aristotle, equity is a means of correcting for the law's inevitable
overinclusiveness. Aristotle writes,
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises
on it which is not covered by the universal statement,
then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred
by over-simplicity, to correct the omission....
ARIsTOTLE, 10 ETHICS, !NTHE NicomAcHEAN ETHmcs 133 (D. Ross trans,

32

revised by J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson, Oxford, 1984).
The legislative history of the U.S. copyright act, including the struggles

among various industry groups, is recounted in the following two

33
34

articles by Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change,
68 OREGON L. REv 275 (1989), and Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REv 857 (1987).
Powers, supra note 16, at 527.
Usually equity is used to soften the law's effect, and is sometimes seen
as a form of mercy. Yet case-by-case approaches can also be used to
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unpredictability of a reasonableness approach keeps this virtue from
being fully realized. An equitable approach can chill desirable
behavior, because potential actors do not know as clearly as they
would under formal rules what behavior is permissible and what is
impermissible. A reasonableness approach also entails higher
administrative costs than a formal approach. This expense is largely
due to the extensive fact-finding required to make a judgment of
social desirability.
It is sometimes thought that market dealings will be best
facilitated by definite rules. However, work in the economics of
entitlements by Jason Johnston suggests that in some circumstances
parties bargain more efficiently in response to uncertain
reasonableness rules than to certain ones.35 So it is yet unclear

35

extend the law's reach, to inhibit socially undesirable behavior. This use
of the equity approach is much more controversial, for it may involve
use of the state's coercive power without fair warning as to what is
prohibited. The danger of chilling the exercise of justifiable liberties
thus makes the use of equity as a "sword" for plaintiffs more
questionable than the use of equity as a "shield" for defendants.
Nevertheless, in the United States law of intellectual property, equitable
approaches have been used not only to assist defendants (as in "fair
use"), but have also been used to create new causes of action for
plaintiffs. Thus, the U.S. has a general privilege (liberty) of free
competition, so that competitors are free to imitate each other so long as
they do not violate copyrights, patents, trade secrets and trademarks.
Yet courts sometimes invoke their equitable judicial power to forbid
counter-productive competition, usually under the tort labelled
"misappropriation" in cases where the liberty to copy results in a strong
enough market failure.
The classic and still controversial misappropriation case was decided by
the United States Supreme Court during World War One, International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In that case the
International News Service (INS) had been barred from the front by
certain European censors, and INS began rewriting the war news
gathered by its competitor Associated Press (AP) and providing that
news to INS's customer newspapers. The resulting pattern of incentives
much resembled a prisoner's dilemma game: productive behavior
(productive news-gathering such as that engaged in by AP) was
becoming too costly given the likelihood of defection (copying) by the
other party. Yet there was nothing in the law of copyrights, patents,
trade secrets or trademarks that prohibited the rewriting of news
gathered by another. The court nevertheless enjoined INS from so using
its competitor's news.
For further discussion of this case and the doctrine of misappropriation
it spawned, see Gordon On Owning Information, supra note 3; Gordon,
Asymmetric Market Failure,supra note 1; Douglas G. Baird, Common Law
Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v.
Associated Press,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411 (1983) (discussing INS's impact on
the development of intellectual property rights).
See Jason Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995).
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whether an equitable, nonformal lack of definiteness is desirable or
undesirable in this regard.
As for the likelihood of error, Professor Powers is correct that
the nonformal reasonableness approach, because of its imprecision, is
prone to error. For example, in copyright cases, judges often disagree
among themselves about whether a given use is "fair." 6 Also, because
of the latitude a reasonableness approach allows, it is capable of being
perverted by bias. Yet these errors or biases will be less costly than an
erroneous or biased judgment enforced on a system-wide basis. A
formal approach may reach technically correct answers to the
questions it poses ("Did you copy X's property? Yes or no.") but the
questions posed may themselves be incomplete, or altogether the
wrong questions to ask.
For example, in property law, a formal approach is
economically justifiable so long as Adam Smith is correct that owners
act automatically as stewards of the social good. But when the
invisible hand fails- which is why "market failure" matters-- trusting
owners' self-interest may not achieve efficiency. Under intellectual
property law, there is an inevitable market failure--namely,
deadweight loss- and, in many cases, additional problems such as
externalities, wealth effects, and transaction-cost barriers. In such
instances, it can be quite unwise to assume that formal deference to a
property owner's judgment will bring social prosperity. Systemic
rules (such as copyright and patent's limits on duration) and case-bycase standards (such as "fair use") work to cut back the intellectual
property owner's dominion.
III. Systemic intellectual property rules that work to
further market formation
As I have argued elsewhere, the best economic case for intellectual
property can be made out when "asymmetric market conditions" are
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For example, in this century the justices of the United States Supreme
Court have decided no more than a half-dozen fair use cases. Yet in two
of those cases the justices split four-to-four. One case involved a movie
parody that Jack Benny did on his television show. Benny v. Loew's, Inc.
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43

(1958) (fair use found not to shelter defendant's parody; too much had
been taken). The other involved a government library that engaged in
massive photocopying of medical journals for the use of doctors.
Williams & Wilkins v. National Institute of Health, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.
1973), affid by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (fair use found
to shelter defendant's photocopying).
In cases where the Supreme Court is evenly divided, the result of the
lower court decision becomes binding.
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present. market failure in the absence of intellectual property rights
and market success in the presence of such rights.-8 The first
condition is an old if controversial story, centering around public
goods. This article will focus more on the second condition. The
second condition is that once a no-copy rule is put in place, licensing
will evolve. In other words, this second condition is met if, in the
presence of a copyright or some other rule restraining strangers from
copying, markets will succeed, not fail.
Markets are believed to be generally a more accurate and less
expensive way to allocate resources efficiently than are courts or
administrative agencies. Market formation is also relevant to
incentives, for monetary payments will not come to creators unless
potential users are able to bargain around the law's restrictions and
pay for licenses or copies.
No matter how otherwise desirable it may be to have a
copyright, patent, or misappropriation system, the arguments in favor
of that system from an economic perspective are empty unless
markets come into being. Without markets in which to sell their
work, the people who own the intellectual products will be unable to
obtain fees, they will therefore lack incentives, and, as a result, fewer
new works will come into being. In addition, unless markets are
forthcoming-- a publisher contracts to distribute copies, a movie
maker is licensed to adapt the book- the public will be denied even
the use of the intellectual products that have been made.
In what follows, the article will review systemic devices that
the copyright system uses to enhance market trades in intangibles,
notably the dynamics of the exclusion right. It will then examine
systemic devices that the copyright system uses to reduce costs such
as deadweight loss. It will then return to "fair use," which is, as
mentioned, a case-by-case inquiry into the substantive desirability of
particular uses.
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See Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure,supra note 1 (from which some of
this discussion is drawn). See alsoGordon, On Owning Information, supra
note 3, at 222-23, 230-38 (presenting the concept of asymmetric market
conditions - but there called "asymmetric market failure" - and

describing its economic bases). Asymmetric market conditions, as a
prerequisite for property rights, also has roots in corrective justice. See
id. at 180-221. However, investigating that aspect would take us too far
afield.
I call the confluence of the two conditions "asymmetric" because where
they obtain, markets are more likely to exist under one legal rule
(copying prohibited) than under its opposite (copying permitted).
In a world where lack of legal restraint on copying leads to market
failure, authors cannot easily get paid. Yet if in a world that has copying
restrictions copyists can form markets, they may not be stymied.
Rather, licensing may evolve.
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A. Overview of systemic devices to enhance tradability
Intellectual property laws use several system-wide rules to enhance
markets. Most such laws define ownership, prescribe modes of
transfer, and, by requiring notices, 39 providing registries, and the like,
make it easier for potential buyers to find potential sellers or licensors.
Further, intellectual property laws define boundaries by stipulating
those subject matters which are capable of being owned and those
rights over which an owner is granted exclusivity. Also, rights are
assigned to what Clifford Holderness has defined as a "closed class," a
definite group (authors and inventors, or their employers or
assignees) rather than to the public, an "open class" from which
determinate transfers can be made only with extreme difficulty. 40
Further, the copyright statute provides some market bridges to assist
in circumstances of market difficulty. Compulsory licenses are a
prime example. 41 At the center of the system lies the grant of exclusive
rights that empower copyright owners to forbid others from certain
behaviors that involve use of the copyrighted work.42 That will be the
focus of the next section.
B. Encouraging trades by giving or denying enforcement rights: the
analogy of restitution
Intellectual property law is largely a matter of internalizing positive
externalities. That is, it seeks to create a legal structure that will direct
payment for the benefits a creative work generates into the pockets of
persons who created the products so that they will have an incentive
to create more such beneficial products in the future. Restitution law
in the United States similarly connotes restoring to someone a
payment for a benefit they have generated: it is generally known as
the law of unjust enrichment. Like intellectual property, restitution
law is also a law of benefits, only it is governed primarily by case
39

40
41

42

American copyright law previously required a notice, c in a circle
followed by name and date, on all published written copies; more
recently, the use of notices has been made largely optional.
Nevertheless, the notices provide a useful service in assisting readers to
know if the material they are using is in current copyright, and, if so,
whom they should contact for licenses.
See Holderness, supra note 14.
Thus, for example, the compulsory license which allows musical groups
to make "covers" of records was adopted in response to a perceived
monopoly problem: at the time phonorecords were to receive copyright
protection, virtually all recording copyrights in songs were held by one
company, Aeolian Co. See Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of
Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 5 WEsTERN NEwENG. L. REv. 203
(1982).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting "exclusive" rights "to do and to authorize"
reproduction, public performance, public display, adaptation, and the
like, for various subject matters.")
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decisions, unlike copyright and patent which are statutory. A more
important difference between the two doctrines is in their baseline
assumptions.
In the United States, a basic restitution doctrine refuses to
award payment to "officious intermeddlers" and "volunteers."3 This
doctrine provides that persons whose labor makes others better off
will ordinarily have no legal recourse if they labor without advance
agreement. Yet intellectual product producers can sue to obtain
payment for the "fruits of their labor" from copyists who never agreed
to pay. Since restitution law contains no presumption that there
should be recovery for benefits generated, it forms a useful contrast
with copyright.4 '
First, consider a homely example to illustrate the different
treatment a laborer without a contract will receive under the two
areas of law. First, imagine someone paints the roof of a building
while its owner is away. After the owner returns the painter presents
himself at the door and says, "pay me for this wonderful benefit I
have given you," pointing at the new paint job which (we will
assume) has increased the value of the building. In such a situation,
the building owner is entitled to say something quite rude. Next, in
contrast, imagine that the home owner, using her own sweat and
paint, does a mural on one of her building's exterior walls, copying
onto it a photograph which has a valid copyright. Perhaps the mural
increases the value of the building more than a new coat of pure
white paint would have; perhaps the mural is an eyesore. In either
event, if the owner of the copyright comes to the door and says, "Pay
me or I'm going to sue you for a very large amount of money," the
building owner had better be very polite.
In neither situation has the building owner agreed in advance
to pay for use of the other's resource. Yet the photographer's labor
embedded in a visual pattern must be paid for, and the painter's labor
embedded in new roof pigment need not be.

43
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§ 2 (1937). See also17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 112. It
is sometimes said that when recovery is denied, plaintiffs tend to be
called "intermeddlers," but when they win, they are more likely to be
called "volunteers." Both words refer, however, to the same basic
pattern: conferring benefits on someone who has not asked for them.
This article uses the terms interchangeably.
This material is taken primarily from Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits,
supra note 3; see also On Owning Information, supra note 3.
Under American copyright law, the work's creator has a right to
exclusively control the rights of reproduction, copying, adaptation,
performance and the like, see 17 U.S.C. § 107; and therefore, can extract
monies and obtain injunctions when someone does these things without
permissionRESTATEMENT OF REsTIrroN
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To prevail in restitution, persons whose voluntary actions
provide benefits to others must ordinarily show one of a few very
45
narrow justifications for departing from the market: mistake,
coercion, 46 request,47 or a narrow range of exigent situations, such as
danger to life and health. 48 Even then, their ability to recover will
often be further restricted by the courts' desire to be sure that the
defendant really was benefitted and that forcing him to pay or
disgorge will not leave him worse off than he would have been in the
status quo ante 9 Similarly, the Restatement of Restitution is not
hospitable to persons who generate benefits as a by-product of selfserving activity. Thus, the Restatement states that:
A person who, incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to
the protection or improvement of his own things, has conferred a
benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution.5
For example, a mine owner whose drainage efforts clear both her
mine and her neighbor's mine of waters is not entitled to contribution
from the neighbor.5 '
A person who writes a book and publishes it is certainly
operating in the furtherance of his or her own interests. Except as to
someone who has bargained with the author for production of the
work (such as a patron, granting agency, employer, or contractpublisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. When a book is massmarketed, many strangers will come across it. If a stranger makes
copies of the book for sale, copyright law will give the author a right
of action against the copyist even if the author "volunteered" to send
the work into the stream of commerce. Since that right of action will
be available whether or not the copyist had a contract with the author
promising to refrain from copying, and whether or not the copyist's
actions harm the author, 2 it is clear that, under copyright law, a
unilateral transfer of 'benefits" is sufficient to trigger liability. There
are many reasons for the difference between the two fields' basic

45

RESTATEMENT OF REsTrTUTON, supra

46
47
48
49
5o

Id. §§ 70-106.

note 43, §§ 6-69.

Id. §§ 107-111.

51

Id. § 112.
See, e.g., id. § 40, cmt. b, at 109.
Id., supra note 43, § 106. There are situations in which protecting one's
own interests does not bar restitution, but these tend to be associated
with coercion, as where a property owner discharges another's duty
when that is the only way to prevent a third party from lawfully taking
the property. Id. § 103.
Id. § 106, illus. 2.

52

Sometimes the absence of harm may make it easier to obtain fair use
treatment, however. See the fourth factor in section 107, set out at

footnote 22.
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rules; one obviously lies in the active or passive role of the person
using the benefit. That is not simply an issue of autonomy. Activity
or passivity also has implications for market formation. To see this,
consider what results would follow if a legally enforced right to
payment were given to the claimants in the two situations.
In the restitution context, the active parties are the
benefactors, the volunteers. Systematically allowing volunteers to sue
for the benefits they have given would reduce their desire to make
contracts with those who might want their services. Admittedly, the
people who are the best at painting houses would have no desire to
sneak around and do it behind the backs of their customers. However,
the people who make messy jobs of it would probably start to paint
and then ask for money after the fact- and could do so in disregard of
whether the building owner preferred a different supplier, thus
ruining the market even for those who would otherwise be willing to
make contracts. In the volunteer context, then, a rule that encourages
contract formation- and thus market formation- is a rule that denies
to the benefit-generator (the potential volunteer) any right of
recompense independent of contract. s3 If a volunteer thinks the law
will not give restitution, then she will seek to make a bargain by
asking the potential recipients for contributions before the project
begins.54

sG

54

Even when there is a market failure in the restitution context, so that the
potential benefactor and the potential recipient are unable to identify or
negotiate with each other, there are only very few circumstances in
which payment is ordered through the courts - mistake, request,
coercion and a narrow range of emergencies justify recovery. This
narrowness of recovery in the restitution context reflects the fact that if
we give the benefit-generator a right to legally enforce recompense, it
would tend to erode markets. See Levmore, supra note 15.
Many examples exist of "inernalizing benefits" by contract. Thus, in
many shopping malls, where small stores are likely to benefit from the
propinquity of large department stores that draw masses of customers,
the small stores may be willing to pay extra rent to subsidize the larger
stores' entry. Something like this also happens in oil exploration:
neighboring lessees will learn a great deal about whether or not it is
worthwhile to drill under their own land from the results of their
neighbor's drilling. So "dry hole contribution agreements" have come
into being: contracts by which the neighbor who stands to benefit from
the information agrees to pay a share of his neighbor's drilling costs
should the hole come up dry.
Similarly, assume that landowners are likely to benefit from a venture
like a resort complex locating nearby, but the resort is so expensive to
build that it cannot afford many externalized benefits- e.g., it will come
to the area only if it is subsidized by the existing landowners or can
itself capture most of the benefits generated. Even in such a case there
may be no need to allow the resort complex to sue the benefitted owners
after the fact in restitution. The developers can try to persuade these
neighbors, in advance, to pay them something to encourage them to
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In the intellectual property context, the likely impact of a right
to recover is quite the opposite.-5 This occurs largely because the
identity of the active party-- and thus the party who has superior
access to information, who is otherwise better able to enter
transactions, and who is better situated to respond to the law's
messages- is different there.
In the volunteer context, the recipient may be ignorant until
the deed is done. It is the benefactor- like the house painter- who has
the greater access to information; he knows where and when he will
act. In restitution, the rule of law that speaks to this active party and
encourages him to seek out consensual market arrangements is
therefore a rule of "no monetary recovery without contract." In the
intellectual property situation, by contrast, the recipient-copyist is the
active party: he can better initiate the transaction. After all, the
copyist knows what he is copying, whereas the plaintiff-owner may
be hundreds of miles away and have no idea copying is being
contemplated. The copyist will also find it fairly easy to identify the

author or copyright owner from the by-line, while the copyright
owner has no such source of information.

Even if the author can identify the potential copyists, she
faces strong strategic behavior problems in making them pay' A

55

56

build nearby. Admittedly, there could be hold-out problems and other
strategic maneuvering making this difficult. So the active party has
another option: the owner of an attraction could quietly buy the land on
which the beneficial spillovers will fall. This is apparently what the
Disney organization did with Epcot and Disney World: it bought up
surrounding land and built on it enough hotels and restaurants to
capture much of the benefit their tourist attraction generates. Where
this is possible, benefits are again internalized without the need for
restitution suits.
This is explored at greater length in Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits, supra
note 3, and in Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 3.
In a world without intellectual property rights, an author may want to
bargain with her audience for payment, but the audience is likely to be a
wide and uncertain one, and the benefits are those that will flow from
an as yet undisclosed intellectual product. Even if the author could
somehow identify all the potential recipients, it would be expensive and
awkward to reach simultaneously all of the persons who will eventually
want access to the work. Even if this were possible, what would happen
when the creator tried to negotiate for a payment from them all in
exchange for disclosing the work? Many of those audience members
might be tempted to hold back in the hope that others' monies would be
sufficient to draw the work into the marketplace where they could then
make a cheap copy. The larger the group of potential purchasers, the
better the odds on the gamble may seem. Also, the work's contents are
largely unknown at this stage; the less certain the benefits, the less
seems to be risked if the gamble does not pay off. Good odds in favor of
winning, and low perceived cost in the event of a loss, make the gamble
very tempting. If enough people take this gamble in the hope of taking
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baseline rule that denied copyright- that gave a benefit-generator no
recovery unless he had a prior contract with the copyist-- would
leave the party with the best ability to contract (the copyist) with little
motive to do so. He would probably prefer to free ride. Therefore, the

law has to give the benefit-generators (the copyright owners) a right
of recovery independent of contract.
Both restitution and intellectual property law give the party
who has the information and ability to internalize the incentive to do
so. The party simply happens to be different in restitution than in
intellectual property. In each case, legal rights are arranged to
facilitate the consensual transfers of resources. The party best
positioned to alter the use to which a resource is puts7 is required to
do so by a systemic choice of a liability or no-liability rule. 58

IV. Systemic intellectual property rules to minimize
market imperfections
Systemic rules are not only used to enhance tradability. They are also
used to distinguish between areas where legal protection is desirable
and areas in which it is not. Industries may exist where perhaps the
need for government to provide exclusion rights is less (because there
is no significant market failure under copy-liberty), or uses which are
more expensive to restrict, or other areas where the costs of copyright
might outweigh its value. Thus, as to subject matters, not all beneficial

products of human ingenuity are capable of being owned. For

57
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a free ride, the requisite funds may not be forthcoming. "Chicken,"
"prisoner's dilemma," and other free rider games illustrate analogous
dynamics.
The presence of a publisher does not much alter the desirability of
granting intellectual property rights to resolve potential bargaining
stalemates. Admittedly, in a world without intellectual property rights
the author may find it easier to deal with a publisher than with an
undifferentiated audience (only one party; low transaction costs), but
then the publisher must deal with the audience. The author's problems
with information, transaction costs, and free riders would simply be
passed on, one step further down the line. How much would a
publisher pay for a book that could be lawfully copied by all comers
once it appeared on the market? Unless the publisher has a lead-time
advantage or some other sort of real-world clout that can discourage
copying, the rate the publisher would offer the author in such a world
might be too low. If the anticipated rate of payment is low, otherwisedesirable works may not be created.
This is a variation of the phenomenon Dean Calabresi referred to as
looking for the 'best briber." Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTs
(1970).
The Coase theorem works only where resources can practicably be
transferred to their highest-valued uses see R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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example, the copyright act grants ownership only in works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 9 and even
among such works the act denies protection to whole classes (such as
typographic design) 6° which, it has been judged, would prove more
costly than beneficial to propertize. 61 Similarly, copyright does not
give owners of copyright a right to control all uses of their works.
Rather, they have control over certain kinds of enumerated uses-those uses whose control is desirably centralized in one entity. Thus,
for example, the composer of a song has exclusive rights over
reproduction and public performance, but not over private
performance. 62
There are also system-wide rules that work to decrease
deadweight loss, and to take better advantage of intangibles'
inexhaustability. The key example here is that of duration. 63 To see
this, we must backtrack to consider a conceptual matter. At one point,
lawyers foundered when asked how to assess, even conceptually, the
value of an intellectual property system. The empirical questions are
hard enough, but there appeared to be a paradox where deadweight
loss was concerned. True, the exclusive right that the copyright or
patent owner receives from the law confers a kind of monopoly
power (of varying effectiveness, depending on the competing
intellectual products available to the audience.) 64 Also true, this
monopoly power can then cause deadweight loss as the intellectual
property owner imposes a price above marginal cost and the quantity
effectively available to the public is reduced. But lawyers were hard
put to assess the significance of this deadweight loss, because the item
whose quantity was being reduced by the intellectual property law
might never have come into existence without that very law.
The way out of this apparent paradox was to make a
conceptual distinction between those works which needed the
intellectual property law to induce their authors to create them, and

59
60

61

62

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
This is a matter of legislative history; the statute itself does not explicitly
mention typography. See House Report supra note 23, at 53-57. The
reason protection was not given to typographic design may have been a
fear that such protection might be misused by reprinters as a way to
fence off public domain literature such as Shakespeare or the Bible.
Industry pressures undoubtedly play a role here as well.
For more on the property formation role of copyright's particular
provisions, see Gordon, Merits of Copyright,supra note 11, and Gordon,
Fair Use, supra note 4.

63

64

In the discussion of duration that follows I am indebted to the work of
Stanley Liebowitz. See, e.g., Liebowitz, supra note 11, at 183-188.
That is, the person who owns copyright in a particular book will have a
monopoly over that book, but not over competing titles by other
authors.
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those works which did not. As to the former items, any production is
due to the legal regime's grant of intellectual property rights. As to the
latter items, the intellectual property law merely functions as a
restriction.68
Thus, one would credit the intellectual property system with
all the value of the works that would not have come into existence
without intellectual property rights. As to these works, any
production of the item would count as a plus, and deadweight loss
would be irrelevant. Then, from this aggregate positive value would
be deducted the deadweight loss in markets for works that would have
been produced even in the absence of intellectual property rights.6
The value of the intellectual property system is the net of67
these two numbers. As Professor Stanley Liebowitz has made clear,
imposing system-wide durational limits-- limiting how long
particular types of intellectual property rights will last- can serve to
maximize this net value.
In the ideal case the economist would want to separate all
works into two classes, those which required intellectual property law
as an incentive and those which did not. But even in the real world,
some rough guesses are possible.
First, as duration increases, the number of new works
attributable to the copyright system's incentive will grow smaller.
The usual law of diminishing marginal utility would seem to govern;
as the duration of a copyright or patent is made longer and longer, the
incentive effect of additional length is likely to decrease. 68 To
illustrate: extending the duration of copyright from one year to five is
likely to so increase the expected rewards of writing a book or

6

The discussion here puts aside what Edmund Kitch calls "prospect
effects," namely, those positive effects on ease of exploitation that can
occur when property rights are centralized in one entity. See Edmund
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. LAw & EcoN. 265
(1977).

66
6
68

Liebowitz, supra note 11.
His graphical representation is particularly helpful. See id. at 187.
This point is probably made most wittily by Lord Macaulay, in his
speeches before the British parliament protesting their extending the
duration of copyright. Lord Macaulay argued that while copyright
might be necessary to ensure a "supply of good books," the monopoly
that it imposed was at best a necessary evil. "For the sake of the good
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer

than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good." THOMAS
MACAULAY, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8
THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan ed.
1866) (discussing a bill which would have extended the duration of
copyright protection).
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designing a poster that the increase will induce some new works to be
made which would not otherwise be created. By contrast, extending
the duration from 101 years to 105 is not likely to have as strong an
effect, so such further extensions will bring less to the "plus" side of
the ledger.
Second, as duration increases, more and more works will not
"need" the extra years to come into existence. As the reader will recall,
years of protection that are not needed for incentives constitute
unnecessary restrictions, and as to them "deadweight loss" should be
counted on the debit side of the social ledger. For example, works
which were called into existence by the promise of a 56-year reward
are "pluses" to be credited to the copyright system for only their first
56 years. The copyright system's grant of exclusive rights for years 57
and following deserves no credit for those works' creation. Equally
importantly, any deadweight loss in markets in years 57 and
following becomes a cost attributable to copyright.
Thus, as duration grows longer, the incentive value of an
added durational restriction grows less, and the deadweight loss
grows larger. The economic goal in choosing a durational limit is to
maximize the difference between the two measures, incentive value
and deadweight loss. Thus, duration can be custom-designed,
providing a set of system-wide sharp rules that limit the periods of
protection for intangibles protected by a given regime, such as the
seventeen to twenty years that U.S. law gives to utility patents, 69 as
compared with the fourteen years of design patents,7 the "life plus
fifty years" that inheres in most copyrights, 71 or the ten years of
protection applicable to semiconductor chip mask works. 72 These
various systemic limits can function to minimize the cost attributable
to deadweight loss.
V. Nonsystemic device to minimize market imperfections:
the fair use doctrine
Sometimes markets do not evolve for a particular creative work or
use-- say, for example, that bargaining is impeded by problems such
as externalities, or high transaction costs in identifying or
communicating with the copyright proprietor. If the copyright laws
prohibited copying in that area it would simply be preventing
copying without yielding creators any monetary advantage. That
would be undesirable. Not only would copyright then fail to perform
69
70
71
72

35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157.
35 U.S.C. § 173.
17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305. There is a different duration for works made for
hire, etc.
17 U.S.C. § 904.
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its primary function, but if users cannot reach market deals with
creators, copyright would impose more costs and generate less benefit
than would a regime without copyright. For though incentives may
be low in a world without copyright, at least copyists and other users
would have access to whatever works happened to be created; by
contrast, in a world where there is copyright but no markets,
incentives are low and the public has no access. Therefore, as
discussed in the initial sections of this article, the ability of users to
form markets is crucial to copyright's economic mission of
encouraging the production and use of new work.
This observation has implications for policy in individual
cases. If a defendant faces market failure in the face of copyright,
then, in his case, the economic foundation for copyright has crumbled.
That is a good argument (if not a complete one) for not enforcing the
copyright against him. Thus, it can be argued that "fair use" has
evolved as an equitable response to market failure, to ensure that
socially desirable uses will not be blocked. 73
For example, consider photocopying by individual scholars.
The transaction costs in contacting a copyright owner for permission
to photocopy might well outweigh the benefit the scholar expects to
reap.74 In such a case, enforcing the copyright would merely
eliminate the photocopying, rather than generate any license fees for
the copyright owner. In such an event, 7 granting "fair use" treatment
to the scholar will not impair the copyright owner's potential income
stream, and will allow a socially beneficial use to go forward that the
transaction costs barrier would otherwise have blocked. High
transaction costs are, of course, a classic cause of market failure.

73

74

75

I have advanced this argument in Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 4, 161415, 1627-41. For further development, see id. at 1614-57 (proposing a 3part test for fair use, and comparing such test with the case law results)
and Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Benefits: The Norms of
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship(reivew essay), 57 U. CHI.
L. Rev. 1009, 1042-43 (1990) [hereinafter PrivateCensorship]. See also, e.g.,
Landes & Posner, supra note 11; Sheldon Light, Parody, Burlesque and the
Economic Rationalefor Copyright, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 615 (1979).
That is, even if the scholar were willing and able to pay whatever price
the copyright owner demanded, the scholar might not be willing to both
pay that price plus bear the time delay, hassle, and secretarial costs
involved in securing a permission.
Note that this analysis is dependent upon the relative size of the
applicable transaction cost barrier. If a clearinghouse or compulsory
license system exists which reduces the transaction costs, then the
scholar may not require fair use treatment in order to allow her use to
go forward.
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The market failure approach is consistent with the great bulk
of "fair use" precedent, 76 and in recent years this sort of argument has
even found its way into the courts' explicit arguments. For example,
in a recent fair use case involving corporate photocopying of scientific
journals, the courts clearly had a market failure model in mind. The
opinions of both the District Court and Court of Appeals discuss what
economists identify as "transaction costs," and examine the extent to
which the defendant's employees- if required to stop photocopying-could find other avenues through which to obtain the desired
material. 77 Similarly, in the most recent fair use case before the
Supreme Court, the opinion indicated that "fair use" can be justified
in part as a response to situations in which copyright owners are
unlikely to give permission at virtually any price. 78
The latter position, advanced in a case involving a song
parody, might strike the reader as inconsistent with the usual
economic assumption that one must take preferences as a given. If
one takes this notion seriously-- it is sometimes known as the
assumption of "consumer sovereignty"-- then it seems the Court
should have accorded to the copyright owner's desire not to be
parodied as much respect as any other value. After all, in theory, an
unwillingness to sell or license merely indicates that the potential
buyer/licensee is not the highest-valued user. So it may seem
wrongheaded of the Supreme Court to suggest that it may be
appropriate to give a parodist - a disappointed licensee - the liberty
to copy for free on the ground that the owner would not sell him a
license. Is the Court under-valuing the owner's preferences? Not
necessarily; there are several explanations of the Court's approach
that are consistent with the traditional economic deference to
individual preferences.

76

See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 4, at 1627-36.

77

See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) aff'd, 60 F.2d 93, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In assessing the plaintiffs claim that
the parody would impair their potential market, the Court responded:
"[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license

78

critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such
uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market." 510 U.S. at
592.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar point in Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright
infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally
cannot be bought."). For other cases involving similar antidissemination motives on the part of copyright proprietors, see Gordon,
Fair Use, supra note 4, at 1632-33.
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"Reasonableness" approaches to author suppression:

When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt her work for
purposes of parodying it, or refuses to give an ideological opponent
permission to quote lengthy passages, or insists on suing anyone who

quotes passages of her memoirs that reflect unfavorably on her, she is
using her copyright as a tool of suppression. 79 The question of
whether authors should be entitled to refuse permission to those users
of whom they disapprove is a complex one. For example, there can be

practical

problems in distinguishing improperly-motivated

suppression from a refusal to license motivated by a desire to
maximize financial return.
More important than the practical
problems may be a conceptual one. If the proper way to look at these

problems is economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of consumer
sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental decision-makers
should not question why someone refuses to sell or license.
Economics "assum[es] that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in
life,"81 and a desire to suppress would seem to be as rational an end as
a desire for fame or fast cars.
Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively emphasized the
importance of transaction costs by showing that, in their absence, the
79

80

81

Similar instances also appear in the corporate realm. For example, when
a newspaper expanded its TV coverage it told its readership about the
extended service in an advertisement that pictured a copyrighted TV
Guide cover for purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for
copyright infringement. Presumably the suit was motivated by
something other than a desire for license fees. The comparative
advertising was held to be a fair use. See Triangle Publications, Inc v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
For example, it can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an
attempt to direct the work into the most valuable derivative work
markets. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT Vol I at 571-73 (rights
over derivative works can affect the direction of investment and the
type of works produced).
Similarly, in regard to unpublished works, it can be difficult to
distinguish cases of suppression from cases of economically motivated
refusals to license. An author accused of suppression may be simply
trying to keep the work out of the public eye temporarily until it reaches
its mature form and can be published.
Even if some practical means existed to distinguish all dissembling
"suppressors" from those copyright owners who are genuinely
motivated by financial return, some cases will present instances of truly
mixed motives. For example, the owner of copyright in an out-of-print
collection of letters might sue a biographer who extensively quotes the
letters, not only out of a dislike for the biographer's message or
perceived inaccuracies, but also out of a desire to preserve the reprint
market for the letters. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 520 F. 2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS oF LAw 3 (3d ed. 1986).
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ultimate allocation of a resource will be efficient regardless of how
entitlements are initially assigned.P So long as the parties can meet
face to face, as in copyright a copyright owner and potential parodist
or critic could often do, why should there be any need for the
judiciary to do anything but enforce whatever property right is before
it?
Whether suppression would or would not be economically
desirable will depend in most cases on empirical analysis of the
particular fact pattern.P But some general observations can indicate
preliminarily why, when copyright owners seek to use the copyright
law to enforce attempts at suppression, neither consumer sovereignty
nor the Coase Theorem suggest that judges give the owners formal
deference 4
At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot always
be relied upon to mediate attempts at suppression and that it might
be economically desirable to refuse authors an entitlement to
The four reasons are the "suppression triangle";
suppress.8s
pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; and endowment effects. The
four reasons are interrelated, and to explicate them let me begin with
the "suppression triangle."
In all these examples, remember: so long as there is the
possibility that the social interest will be better served by refusing to

82

See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 58. The Coase Theorem

is effective at least in the absence of factors such as transaction costs,
wealth or income effects, and strategic behavior. See id. (transaction
costs). See also, e.g., Donald Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15
J. LAW & EcON. 427 (1972) (strategic behavior). Compare RONALD H.
COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND

157, 170-74 (1988) (suggesting that income effects are unlikely
to be significant, at least in contexts not involving irreplaceable goods).
Even if one interprets copyright's economic goal as being solely the use
of incentives to "promote knowledge," so that satisfying the copyright
owner's personal tastes would not count as an independent value, the
empirical answer to suppression questions would not be easy: in a given
case enforcing any particular type of suppression would both keep some
knowledge secret, and yield long-term incentives that could aid
knowledge in the long run (because authors who can suppress have a
copyright worth more than authors who cannot). Cf., Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967)
(the effects of demoralization on productivity). Which of the two
potential effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from
enforcing suppression or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be
determined a priori.
For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Right Not
to Use (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
Additional reasons might include, e.g., the potential nonmonetizability
of first amendment values. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 4, at 1631-32.
THE LAW
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enforce the owner's copyright, the case is made for using a nonformal,
reasonableness mode of inquiry. One would then need to compare
the costs of the extra suppression that would result from adhering to a
formal pro-owner result, with the administrative and other costs that
would be necessary in employing a "reasonableness" or "fairness"
inquiry. In the United States, with its strong history of prizing free
speech, the costs of improper suppression of news or cultural material
is viewed as very high, tending to outweigh the administrative cost
consideration
1. Suppression Triangle.

I use the term "suppression triangle"86 to point to the fact that in cases
involving the suppression of information or other intellectual
productsy at least three parties are affected: (1) the person who seeks
or threatens to make the contested use (for example, the potential
parodist), (2) the copyright owner who wants to keep the material
from being copied or adapted (the potential suppressor), and (3) the
person or persons who would want to see the material (the potential
recipients). This is the triangle of affected interests. Yet in the
suppression transaction typically only two parties are present: the
potential user (such as a parodist), and the copyright owner. Whether
an attempt to suppress is likely to be value-maximizing will depend,
inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted third party, the class
of potential recipients, is represented by the two immediate
participants.
Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use is to
the public, the more the public should be willing to pay for it, and the
more the parodist should be willing and able to bid for permission.
Thus, the notion of the Invisible Hand expects that any market
participant will be in a position to reflect the interests of affected third
parties (that is, the public audience). Nevertheless, the Invisible Hand
often falters, and the possibility of misallocation remains.
Consider a hypothetical novelist or moviemaker who wants
to keep the world from knowing what a hostile critic or parodist has

86

I base this theory in part on the work of James Lindgren in the blackmail

87

area. See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 COLU.M.
L. REv. 670 (1984) (discussing the three-party structure involved). For
an economic analysis of blackmail stressing other aspects of blackmail
activity, see Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74
VA. L. REV. 655, 673-74 (1988).
I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance
of the blackmail literature to this problem.
Information can implicate different issues from literary expression and

other intellectual products; for purposes of this very general discussion,
however, I shall group all together under the rubric "information."
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to say about his work. Assume also that the critic or parodist wants to
quote from the work or use its imagery and that use of the quotation
or imagery is somehow essential to the comprehensibility or
believability of the criticism or parody.88 If the law required the critic
or parodist to purchase licenses to quote or paraphrase, how sure
could we be that the "highest-valued" use would ensue?
For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the critic
or parodist stands to earn at most a thousand dollars profit from even
the best-written product. Assume that the novelist or film-maker
would lose fifty thousand if the criticism or parody is published.
Since the copyright owner would charge at least fifty thousand for a
license to criticize or ridicule his work and the critic or parodist stands
to gain only one thousand from publishing, it may look like the
copyright owner holds the "highest valued" use when compared with
the parodist or critic. But that may be an illusion resulting from the
fact that the third party (in the owner/ user/ public triangle) is not
being counted as part of the deal.
The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the
public (who would thus be warned off from, let's say, a much-hyped
romance novel that doesn't really excite anyone who reads past page
five) to the tune of that same fifty thousand, or perhaps even more.
On these hypothesized facts, requiring the publisher to buy a license
from someone who would not sell it is a bad idea, and giving the
publisher (the critic or parodist) free use is a good idea. And both are
consistent with economic measures of value. If the critic had been able
to capture the full value that the review gave to the audience, then the
novelist's fifty thousand minimum asking price would have been met.
A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full value
that the work holds for the audience. This can occur for many
reasons. 89 There may be significant positive externalities and surplus

89
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There is another factor that may be at work here as well: the
idea/expression dichotomy. Since under current law copyright owners
cannot prevent others from using their ideas, it could be argued that
little suppression of note could occur; it might be suggested that a critic
deprived of the privilege to quote could nevertheless communicate
effectively.
For simplicity's sake, therefore, assume that in the following examples
whatever the defendant has taken from the first artist's work could be
considered copyrightable expression rather than simply "idea" and that
the use of the copyrighted expression is somehow essential to the
effectiveness of the planned derivative work.
As economist Michael L. Katz writes of the similar problem in the
research and development area:
In the absence of perfect discrimination, the firm
conducting the R &D will be unable to appropriate all of
the surplus generated by the licensing of its R & D, and
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in the market for parodies, for example. There also may be other
complications in the markets for reviews and parodies, such as
pecuniary losses that diverge from societal economic losses.
2. Pecuniary losses.
Much of the loss that can come from a critical review will often be
merely pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to society but rather a
shifting of revenues from one novelist to another and possibly better
one. 90 It is as if the triangle now were a geometric figure with four
points (the criticized novelist, the critic, the public, and the better
novelist). If one could add to the price offered for the "license to
criticize" an amount reflecting the monies that the better novelist
would reap, it might be enough to make the difference. Since this
cannot happen,9' mere pecuniary losses may take on an importance
they should not have and they might prevent socially desirable
licensing.
3. Managerialdiscretion.
Another possible complication has to do not with the potential
buyer's inability to raise the appropriate amount of capital, but with
the potential licensor's potential inability to know even a good deal
when it comes along. This complication I will label managerial
discretion,92 by which I mean to embrace all those things that may
make managers in complex corporations sometimes arrive at
decisions that are less value-maximizing than they could be. I would
include here, for example, personal risk aversion, bureaucratic
structure, group dynamics, and laziness.3 Thus, the officials of a

90

91

92

9

the firm will sell its R & D results at prices that lead to
inefficiently low levels of utilization by other firms.
Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and
Development, 4 RAND J. ECON. 527, 527 (1986).
See Richard A. Posner, Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline 17 (September 21, 1987) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Chicago Law Review) (using
pecuniary effects to explain why landowners who create certain positive
spillovers are not entitled to payment from those who benefitted).
Journalistic ethics undoubtedly prohibit reviewers from accepting
subsidies for doing hostile reviews.
There is a fairly extensive literature on the controversial question of
whether managerial discretion exists and if so what impact it has and
what should be done about it; all I mean to suggest here is the simple
possibility that managers in complex corporations do not always make
the same decisions that an individual owner of a corporation would.
In an individual, a taste for risk or laziness might be a legitimate part of
her utility curve, but a manager is supposed to act unselfishly on the
part of the corporation. There is a large literature on these agency
problems.
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company that owns a given copyright may refuse to license simply
because the license is in an unfamiliar field and their particular
bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk takers more than it
rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise controversial
licenses would be at issue, the human desire to "play it safe" might
prevent value-maximizing transfers from occurring. 94 Managerial
discretion is just one of many agency problems that can prevent the
parties from dealing with each other like the unitary participants in
the classic Coasian transaction.
4. Endowment orwealth effects: pricelessness
All of the above are reasons why socially desirable "licenses to be
critical" are not likely to be granted if left solely to the devices of
copyright owners. 95 One additional and probably most important
factor remains to be discussed: the difference between willingness to
pay and willingness to sell, sometimes identified with "endowment"
or "wealth" effects.%
The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving
someone an entitlement makes that person richer, and this may
change how the holder values both the entitlement and other
resources, and this in turn may affect how entitlements are eventually
allocated once bargaining between that person and other persons is
completed. 97 Wealth effects do not retard resources from moving to
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95

9
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It might be argued that a taste for laziness or risk aversion are simply
preferences that deserve the same respect under the notion of consumer
sovereignty as other desires. However, we are not talking here about
the risk aversion or laziness of the copyright owner, but of some person
who is fortuitously placed within the licensor organization to be able to
control licensing decisions. Whether gratifying such a person's taste in
regard to laziness or risk serves greater economic ends (as, e.g., a form
of compensation) is an even more complex question than the question of
how economics should analyze an owner's taste for such things.
Of course, such licenses might be granted; I offer here only an abstract
analysis which would need to be empirically verified.
Wealth effects are, roughly, the impact on one's preferences brought
about by a change in wealth, including the change brought about by
being given, or being denied, an entitlement. See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, The
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. EcON.
LnUERATURE 1 (1971) (the allocative impact of wealth effects illustrated at
18-21, though not explicitly in the context of the Coase theorem).
For an excellent numerical example, see id. at 18-21. It is well
recognized that a divergence often exists between the price that a
potential buyer would be willing to pay for a resource he does not own,
and the price that the same person would demand before he would sell
that same resource if the law had initially awarded its ownership to
him. What is less clear is what terminology, explanations, and
characterizations are best employed for discussing the phenomenon.
For a valuable discussion suggesting, inter alia, that traditional "wealth
effects" do not fully explain divergence between willingness-to-accept
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hands in which, given a particular entitlement starting-point, has the
highest-valued use for them. Nor are they often strong enough to
make a difference; in instances where fungible commodities are sold
in markets populated by many buyers and sellers, "buy" prices and
"sell" prices probably tend to converge. But, when wealth effects do
have an impact, they have the potential of rendering the meaning of
"highest-valued" use indeterminatein the sense that the location of the
highest-valued use is not independent of the law. Where wealth
effects are strong, everything depends on the legal assignment of
entitlements that form the transaction's starting point. As a result, in
such cases the search for the highest-valued use cannot provide a
good basis for assigning initial entitlements.
Professor Coase showed that in a world without transaction
costs, resources will be traded to their highest-valued uses, so that, as
between any two users of a resource, if A can use the resource more
productively than B, A will end up with it0 9 Therefore, many
scholars argue, in a real world full of transaction costs that can
impede bargaining, it often makes sense to "mimic the market 10D and
assign legal rights to the highest-valued user in the first instance. This
is a core insight of Law and Economics.
Yet the Law and Economics argument largely depends on
there being a stable highest-valued user°. The injunction to "seek
efficiency by mimicking the perfect market" only makes normative
sense if the perfect market allocation is a constant. If the allocation of
rights significantly affects the monetary valuation that parties place
on a resource, then there may be no stable economic reality for the
law to seek to mimic.
There is indeed a rare class of goods which lack this stability.
These are the precious, personal, irreplaceable, crucial goods one
thinks of as "priceless." Examples are many: the Dead Sea Scrolls;
family heirlooms; one's children; one's health; one's reputation; one's
peace of mind. The monetary value a person places on one of these
goods may well depend on whether the person has a legal entitlement
to it (whether she "owns" it) or whether she must purchase it.
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and willingness-to-pay, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer,
Willingness to Pay vs Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic
Implications, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. 59(1993).
For a dramatic hypothetical example, see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 491, 518519 (1990) ("flip flop" of rights).
See Coase, supra note 58.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 25, for a classic explanation of
market-mimicry.
For further exploration, and for citation to relevant literature, see
Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 97.
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Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most people
would be unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so that Jane Smith
might turn down an offer of five million dollars from Billionaire X for
one of her kidneys. Similarly, if Jane Smith has kidney failure and one
of her dying relatives wills her a healthy kidney, she might well be
unwilling to take the billionaire's five million dollars in exchange for
her entitlement to it. If so, Jane Smith looks like the kidney's "highestvalued user." But should she have no entitlement to the kidney from
the recently-deceased person (perhaps because the relevant
jurisdiction does not recognize such bequests as enforceable), Jane
Smith's own budget and health insurance will place a limit on how
much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It is highly unlikely she
will be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney. If so, Billionaire X
will appear to be the "highest-valued user." One can draw from such
a pattern no reliable information about whether the resource has its
highest value in the hands of the billionaire or Jane Smith. This
phenomenon might be called the "pricelessness effect."
The pricelessness effect is a subset of the category that
economists call "endowment effects" which in turn is related to
"wealth effects": since assigning an entitlement to someone makes
that person wealthier, it can affect the valuation the person puts on
resources. For example, often "ask" and "offer" prices differ from each
other. Many people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it does not
apply when significant wealth or endowment effects are present. But
usually the wealth or endowment effect is so minor that it does not
impair the reliability of using a market mimicry approach to model
efficiency.102
The "pricelessness effect" deserves having its own name
precisely because the subcategory of effects it denotes are likely to be
significant. The "pricelessness effect" comes into play when the
entitlement at issue pertains to a good that (1) an individual or group
values very highly and (2) which is virtually irreplaceable, and (3)
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The impact of endowment or wealth effects is sometimes exaggerated.
See Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 82 at 170-174
(discussing arguments re the presumed effect of changes in legal
position on the distribution of wealth and on the allocation of
resources).
Professor Coase argues that the impact of wealth effects can be
overstated because, among other things, if the legal rules are known in
advance, the prices of applicable resources will likely alter in a way that
minimizes such effects; in addition, he suggests, contractual provision
for contingencies may be available to mitigate some changes in legal
rules. See id. at 157. See also id. at 170-174. Neither of these devices are
likely to eliminate the wealth effect- here "pricelessness"- in the context
of authorial suppression of embarrassing criticism, however.
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when it is the allocation of that very good'3 which is at issue. As to
such items, the initial placement of the entitlement is likely to have a
sharp effect on the price and allocation of the resource, even in the
absence of transaction costs.
In cases of parody or criticism-- both areas where "fair use"
treatment tends to be awarded to defendants-- reputation may be at
issue. To many, reputation is priceless in the sense we have been
discussing. For example, a novelist who fears that a journalist will use
extensive quotations from her book to bolster a hostile review will be
most unlikely to sell the journalist a license to copy those quotationsregardless of the price offered. But that does not mean the author's
preference is the "highest-valued use" in any meaningful sense, since
that same author may be unable to buy silence if the law gives the
journalist a "fair use" liberty right to publish. A similar analysis can
be made of parody: since most people intensely dislike being
ridiculed, the legal right may determine where the highest-valued use
lies. 1°4 In such cases, the market is useless as a guide, and formal
deference to owners' market powers is inappropriate.
For example, assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner who
has an entitlement not to license and who is otherwise financially
comfortable; she has perhaps $4000 in the bank and a two-year old
car and a prospect of steady royalties. She may be tempted by B's
offer of, say, $10,000 for a license to use her work, but she can afford
to say no without altering her lifestyle. If B's project is an ordinary
commercial project and A will not be sacrificing more than $10,000
from foregoing alternative uses of the work, she will probably license.
(It might also happen that B's project would not require an exclusive
license and would not otherwise interfere with A's other licensing
opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go forward would have
no opportunity cost at all for A. She would be even more likely to
license such a use.) However, if B's project is hostile toward A's work
as a whole, A may well refuse the license, either to protect her longterm economic interest (which may be a mere pecuniary loss,
remember), her aesthetic reputation, or her feelings.
If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to prevent
B's use, then she would have to persuade B not to publish (cf.,
blackmail.) The most she could offer B to persuade B not to make the
critical use planned is the amount in her bank account, plus whatever
1o3
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That is, while I predict that the law's assignment of rights in organs is
likely to have a distinct effect on a kidney's allocation, it is a more
complex question whether the law's assignment of rights in organs will
have much of an effect on the allocation of other resources.
These points are also explored in Gordon, Private Censorship,supra note
73 at 1042-43; also see Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 73, at 1632-36 (antidissemination motives).
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she could sell her car for, plus whatever she could borrow on the
strength of her expected royalty stream. The total may well be less
than $10,000, and A will probably demand a price in excess of $10,000.
Give A the entitlement and the highest-valued use of the contested
expression is in her hands; give B the entitlement and the highestvalued use is in that licensee's hands. The locus of the "highestvalued use" has shifted as a result of where the law places its
entitlement.
In such cases, looking to the results of consensual transactions
will not give us any information about who "should" have the right.
Another way to put the point is this: 0 5 Economics is
sometimes used as a normative guide for good social policy. When it
is used in this fashion, its primary claim to legitimacy stems from the
links between economics and utilitarianism. 106 The more that income
distribution restricts the expression of individuals' preferences, the
more shaky the link between economics and utility becomes. This
linkage has the potential for completely breaking down in cases of
"pricelessness." Though in such cases the parties' preferences may
remain constant, both in their objects and in their intensity, a shift in
who owns the entitlement may effectively disable one of those parties
from effectuating that preference. Thus a legal regime that is
committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism would be
unwise to rely upon a money-bound market model for normative
guidance in cases of pricelessness.
In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress a
hostile use of the copyrighted work, in a case where the "pricelessness
effect" is likely to make a determinative difference, does not
necessarily contravene economic principles. In such an instance, it is
appropriate for even an economically-oriented court to refuse to defer
to the copyright owner, and instead make an independent weighing
of how enforcing the copyright in the given instance would affect
welfare, and any other relevant consequentialist or
nonconsequentialist policies.
VI. Conclusion
This article has employed the notion of asymmetric market conditions
to tie together many aspects of intellectual property law. The primary
focus has been on explaining why American copyright law uses a
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This belief is rather controversial. See, e.g., such classic sources on the

debate as the Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
485 (1980) and Richard A. Posner, THE EcoNoMIcs OF JusTicE (1987) for

further discussion of the question of whether utilitarianism and
economics are truly linked in this way.

On the Economics of Copright,Restitution, and "Fair Use"

45

nonformal, equitable, substantive reasonableness approach like "fair
use" in contexts where other forms of American intellectual property
law use approaches that are formal, rule-bound, and system-wide.
The article also examines the dynamics behind the key systemic
choice made by copyright law, which is to reverse the presumption of
restitution law that people who refrain from crossing others' tangible
boundaries are free to take advantage of each other's labor. In
intellectual property law, this presumptive freedom is replaced by a
duty not to copy.
Economics does not capture everything of importance. 1' 7
Nevertheless, a model of asymmetric market conditions can provide
a useful method for unifying a number of disparate questions in the
economics of intellectual property law.
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For further examination of the author's views on the interplay of
economic and non-economic modes of normative reasoning, see Wendy
J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case,
141 U. PA. LAW REv. 1741 (1993).

